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Abstract 
Using data from 2006 to 2015, we study the impacts of the Global Financial Crisis, the Arab 
Spring, and the conflict in Ukraine on European Investment Bank (EIB) investments in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries and in Turkey. Our dataset offers insights 
on how the EIB adjusts its investments in the aftermath of the three events at the global, 
regional and country level. The impacts of the events vary at the global ENP level. They also 
vary between and within the two ENP dimensions and between the ENP countries. We find 
mixed impacts for Turkey. Our results indicate that political motivation rather than economic 
demand determine EIB investments in several ENP countries. Political motivation also plays 
a major role when defining EIB investments in Turkey. Our study lays out the foundation 
for quantitative research on the EIB operations in ENP countries. 
  
  
 1 
Introduction 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the European Union’s (EU) “neglected institution”.1 
Despite the size and geographical scope of its activities, little research exists on the EIB. Yet, 
two features highlight its importance. 2  First, the EIB is the world’s largest multilateral 
financial institution.3 Its lending volume has exceeded that of the World Bank since 1993.4 Its 
expenditures were three times larger than those of the EU in 2015.5 Second, “the EIB stands 
virtually alone (…)” among the seven EU institutions that has direct contact with economic 
agents in and outside the EU, in both the public and private sector.6  
EIB’s operations in the countries of the European Neighbour Policy (ENP) reach up to 
EUR 2.9 billion annually.7 Its operations are the third largest in the region among Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDB) in 2015. In 2002, European Commission President Romano Prodi 
called the future ENP countries a “ring of friends”.8 Twelve years later, former Austrian 
chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel referred to them as the “ring of fire”.9 In the interim, the world 
experienced the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression; while on the regional 
                                                 
I am grateful to the European Investment Bank and my interviewees for answering my enquiries. I thank Erwan 
Lannon and Laura Querton for their constructive comments and suggestions. A special thank you goes to my 
reviewer.  
1 N. Robinson, ‘The European Investment Bank: The EU’s Neglected Institution’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, vol. 47, no. 3, 2009, p. 668. 
2 D. Dinan, Encyclopedia of the European Union, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2000, updated ed., p. 202. 
3 EIB, The European Investment Bank at a Glance, Luxembourg, 2017, p. 1. 
4 Dinan, loc. cit. 
5 EIB, Financial Report 2015, Luxembourg, 2016a, p. 26. 
European Commission, Consolidated Annual Accounts of the European Union 2015,Brussels, 2016, p. 16. 
6 Dinan, loc. cit. 
7 The EIB starts operating 1994 in the Southern dimension and 2006 in the Eastern dimension of the future ENP. 
EIB, Chronology of the EIB: 1958-2008, 2017b, retrieved 27 April 2017, http://www.eib.org/about/key_figures/ 
timeline/index.htm 
8 P. Blom et al., Dealing with Neighbours: Fighting a Ring of Fire or Building a Ring of Friends?, Guetersloh, 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, p. 8. 
9 J. Dannenberg, Architecture for a New European Neighbourhood Policy, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, retrieved 
04 March 2017, https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/topics/aktuelle-meldungen/2016/august/trilogue-
salzburg-2016/.  
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level, Maghreb and Mashreq face a political turmoil with the Arab Spring, and post-soviet 
states experienced the annexation of Crimea.10  
Turkey is the crossroad between the Southern and Eastern dimensions of the ENP. It 
is the only country bordering both dimensions. Its geographically strategic position combined 
with its military and economic power, its armed forces being the second largest in North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its economy being the 18th largest in the world, 
make Turkey a crucial component when analysing EIB operations in ENP countries. 11 , 
Moreover, the EIB has ongoing operations in Turkey since 1965.12 To illustrate the scope of 
EIB’s operations in Turkey, more than EUR 25.8 billion signatures have been carried out in 
Turkey since 2001.13 
The EIB defines signatures as the signature of a contract for financing. Using approvals 
would bias our results since not every approval is ultimately signed. 14  In addition to 
signatures’ finality, data on signatures is also more extensive. 
Accordingly, we examine to what extent EIB signatures changed in ENP countries 
from 2006 to 2015, while taking into account the changes in Turkey. Taking the three events 
into consideration, we divide our research in three sub-questions:  
1. To what extent did the Global Financial Crisis change EIB signatures in ENP 
countries and in Turkey between 2006-2015?  
                                                 
10 S. Claessens, et al., ‘Cross-country experiences and policy implications from the global financial crisis’, 
Economic Policy, vol. 25, no. 62, 2010, p. 269. 
For an analysis of the ENP, refer to: E. Lannon, The European neighbourhood policy’s challenges: les défis de 
la politique européenne de voisinage, Bruxelles, P.I.E Peter Lang, 2012 
11  The World Bank, GDP ranking 2015, 2017, retrieved 29 April 2017, databank.worldbank.org/data/ 
download/GDP.xls. 
A. Taylor, Turkey’s increasingly complicated relationship with NATO, The Washington Post, 2016, retrieved 29 
April 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/07/19/turkeys-increasingly-
complicated-relationship-with-nato/?utm_term=.a3ed712c4bf1. 
12 EIB, Projects financed: multi-criteria list, 2017e, retrieved 29 April 2017, http://www.eib.org/projects/loan/ 
list/index.htm?from=&region=3&sector=&to=&country=TR.  
13 EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015, Luxembourg, 2002-2016. 
14 An approval means that the Board of Directors approves a given financing.  
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2. To what extent did the Arab Spring change EIB signatures in ENP countries and in 
Turkey between 2006-2015? 
3. To what extent did the conflict in Ukraine change EIB signatures in ENP countries 
and in Turkey between 2006-2015?  
Our observation period is from 2006 to 2015. Starting our observation period two years 
before the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis takes pre-crisis trends into account. In order 
to consider long-term trends, we present data since 2001. Since the ENP was launched in 2004, 
our data also considers pre-ENP operations. EIB data is available until 2015. The EIB does 
not carry out any operations in the period under observation in two ENP countries, Libya and 
Belarus. We therefore exclude these two countries from our analysis. 
The Global Financial Crisis came to a head on the 15 September 2008 when the US 
government allowed Lehmann Brothers to go bankrupt under Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code.15 Thus, we refer to 2008 as the event year for the Global Financial Crisis. 
Demand falls after the Global Financial Crisis and economic output is reduced. Since the EIB 
is demand-driven, we formulate the following hypothesis:16 
H1: The Global Financial Crisis decreased EIB signatures in the sample countries. 
Although the Arab Spring is sparked by the self-immolation of a young street vendor 
in Tunisia on the 17 December 2010, the turmoil started in early 2011.17 We therefore consider 
2011 as the event year for the Arab Spring. The turmoil caused by the Arab Spring increased 
risk for investments. Consequently, investors demanded higher compensation for the risk 
                                                 
15  L. Elliott, Global Financial Crisis: Five Key Stages, The Guardian, 2011, retrieved 26 April 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/aug/07/global-financial-crisis-key-stages. 
16 T. Gutner, Banking on the environment: Multilateral development banks and their environmental performance 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1999, p. 68. 
17  E. Abdelmoula, How Tunisia saved its ‘Arab Spring’, Aljazeera, 2015, retrieved 26 April 2017, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/analysis-tunisia-saved-arab-spring-151028083410659.html.  
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taken. When costs increase but revenues do not increase accordingly, fewer investments 
remain economically viable. This leads us to our second hypothesis: 
H2: The Arab Spring decreased EIB signatures in the sample countries. 
Facing ongoing protests, Ukrainian President Yanukovych fled Kiev on 22 February 
2014. Five days later, armed personnel without insignia began to seize Crimea.18 Following 
the referendum held on 16 March 2014, Russia recognized Crimea’s independence two days 
later.19 Within a few days, fighting between pro-Russian forces and Ukrainian authorities 
broke out in Donetsk and Luhansk.20 We consider 2014 as the event year for the conflict in 
Ukraine. Regarding the conflict in Ukraine, our argument follows the logic of the Arab Spring. 
Accordingly, our third hypothesis reads as: 
H3: The conflict in Ukraine decreased EIB signatures in the sample countries. 
We assume that the Global Financial Crisis, the Arab Spring and the conflict in Ukraine 
are single-shot events that are independent of each other. By definition, single-shot events take 
place during a single unit of time.21 Moreover, we consider the three events as exogenous. 
Therefore, the direction of causality goes from our three events to EIB signatures. The latter 
are our dependent variable. 
In order to test our hypotheses, we apply descriptive statistics and conduct structured 
expert interviews. Data for descriptive statistics was retrieved from official EIB documents. 
Our dataset consists of 252 entries of EIB signatures in ENP countries and in Turkey between 
                                                 
18  European Parliament, Ukraine: timeline of events, Brussel, 2016, retrieved 28 April 2017, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20140203STO34645/ukraine-timeline-of-events.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21  D. Wackerly, W. Mendenhall & R. Scheaffer, Mathematical Statistics with Applications, Belmont, 
Brooks/Cole, 7th edn., p. 392.  
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2006 and 2015.22 Expert interviews provided additional data that is normally less accessible.23 
Therefore, they complement our quantitative data. 
We first discuss the development theories upon which Multilateral Development 
Banks (MDBs) such as the EIB are founded.24 Taking this into account, we present the few 
research existing on the EIB. Our empirical analysis starts at the global level of the ENP. We 
separately look at the two ENP dimensions before individually at each country. While our 
analysis at the global and regional level accounts for dynamics between the dimensions, the 
country level analysis considers local developments. We complete our country analysis with 
Turkey.  
Our results show that the overall level of signatures in ENP countries in the year after 
the three events decreases. On the regional level, the EIB increased its signatures in the 
Southern dimension after the Global Financial Crisis and the Arab Spring. It almost 
maintained their level after the conflict in Ukraine. In contrast to the Southern dimension, 
signatures in the Eastern dimension fell after the Global Financial Crisis. Similar to the 
Southern dimension, signatures rose in the Eastern one after the Arab Spring. They continue 
to rise after the conflict in Ukraine. Turkey saw rising signatures in the year of the Global 
Financial Crisis and Arab Spring However, they sharply fall after the Global Financial Crisis. 
Signatures also fell during the conflict in Ukraine. Despite this decline in 2014, they showed 
an upward trend since 2010. 
We aim at laying the foundation for research on EIB’s operations in ENP countries and 
in Turkey. At the same time, we contribute to the research gap on the EIB itself. Moreover, 
                                                 
22 The entire data set is available upon request. 
23 For the expert interviews, we follow the principles of J. Gläser & G. Laudel, Experteninterviews und qualitative 
Inhaltsanalyse, Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010, 2nd edn. 
24 See chapter 0 for a definition of MDBs. 
 6 
our study offers insights on how MDBs adjust their operations in the aftermath of major 
exogenous events.  
1. Common Legal Foundation, Uncommon Understanding of Multilateral 
Development Banks 
Although not listed as an institution in article 13 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), 
the EIB considers itself as the European Union’s “(…) long-term financing institution.”25 It is 
a multilateral borrower and lender.  
The EIB in the Treaties of the EU 
Member States and the European Commission form the EIB in three ways. First, the 
Member States define the EIB’s mandate in the TEU and in the Treaty on the Functioning on 
the European Union (TFEU) as well as in three protocols and the EIB’s Statutes annexed to 
the treaties. Thus, the Statute of the EIB has the same legal value as the treaties.26 Second, 
both the Member States and the European Commission are the EIB’s shareholders. Third, they 
designate the members of the statutory bodies. 
The EIB, with its AAA rating, can raise capital at favourable conditions. Such 
favourable conditions lower the cost of capital, which in turn increases the net present value 
(NPV) of an investment. They allow the financing of projects that otherwise are not profitable. 
Thus, the EIB creates a leverage effect through its lending, blending and advisory activities.  
A Multilateral Development Bank 
The missions of MDBs “reflect the development aid and cooperation policies 
established by their member states. They have the common task of fostering economic and 
                                                 
25 EIF, The EIB Group, A Responsible Institution, Luxembourg, 2016, p. 4.  
The EIB Group was established in 2005. It consists of the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF). 
26 EIB Group 2016a, loc. cit., p. 3. 
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social progress in partner countries by financing projects, supporting investment and 
generating capital.”27  
The definitions provided by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the World Bank and the EIB itself of MDBs share similarities: the 
membership of sovereign states and remits that explicitly mention social progress besides 
economic development. Yet, the presence of the European Commission as the only 
supranational member of the EIB adds a distinctive feature to the EIB. 
MDBs are “mandated to supply long-term development finance and to promote 
sectoral and institutional reforms.” 28 While MDBs are the world’s leading institutions of 
development finance, they fall short in outlining the “development theories upon which they 
base their operations.”29 Theoretical frameworks explaining the motivation behind MDBs 
emerge from development theories dating from the post-war period when the Bretton Woods 
institutions were founded. The following three theoretical frameworks build the cornerstones 
for MDBs: the project theory, the two-gap theory, and the income distribution theory.30 MDBs 
may decide for a balanced use of the three sometimes contradictory theories to fulfil their 
mandate.31  
The ongoing debate within MDBs and their member governments on development 
policies and programs is partly due to “the disagreement on the most valid theory and the most 
                                                 
27 Ibid.  
28 In contrast to MDBs, “(…) the IMF’s traditional mandate is to provide short- to medium-term support for 
countries with macroeconomic and balance-of-payments problems. The IMF’s financial support is usually 
triggered by crises and oriented towards temporary support, whereas the MDBs provide continuous lending.” 
There is a division of labour among IFIs. 
K. Berensmann & P. Wolff,’ The Role of International Financial Institutions in Macroeconomic Crisis’, Bonn, 
German Development Institute, 2014, Discussion Paper 33/2014, p. 1. 
29  See J. Sanford, ‘Development Theory and the Multilateral Development Banks: An Assessment of the 
Effectiveness of Strategies Used in International Development Finance’, The American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology, vol. 34, no. 2. 
30  J. Sanford, ‘Development Theory and the Multilateral Development Banks: An Assessment of the 
Effectiveness of Strategies Used in International Development Finance’, The American Journal of Economics 
and Sociology, vol. 34, no. 2, p. 176. 
31 Ibid., p. 175. 
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appropriate understanding of the development process.”32 Second, the raised criticism shows 
the vulnerability of these theories. Even though regularly applied, a critical belief in them 
remains necessary. Third, MDBs serve various purposes and functions. Since MDBs “borrow 
money, they must respect sound banking principles.”33 At the same time, these banks are also 
“development institutions dedicated to economic growth and expand welfare. Thus, they must 
remain sensitive to macroeconomic and distributive aspects.”34  
2. The EU’s Neglected Institution35 
Despite being the world’s largest MDB and being mentioned in the EU Global Strategy of 
2016, Robinson’s quote that the EIB is the “EU’s neglected institution” remains valid.”36 Most 
research on the EIB is of qualitative nature. Moreover, they often offer a snapshot of the 
current situation and rarely a historical analysis taking into account dynamics. Our quantitative 
time-series analysis addresses this research gap.  
Following a multilevel governance approach, Robinson argues that EIB financing 
significantly shapes the “relationship between sub-national actors and national 
governments.”37 He recognises that the EIB and the volume of its operations have “huge 
effects on EU policy-making.”38 Despite the fact that EIB funding has to be repaid compared 
to structural funds, the EIB has a significant leverage effect through its lending operations.39 
Accordingly, the EIB represents a major source of financing for major projects in key policies 
areas.40 However, the failure to acknowledge the scope of the EIB leads to an incomplete 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 192. 
33 Sanford, loc. cit. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Robinson, loc. cit. 
36 Ibid. 
European External Action Service, Share Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, Brussels, 2016, p. 40. 
37 Ibid., p. 669. 
38 E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’, American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 75, no. 1, 1981, p. 1. 
39 Robinson, loc. cit. 
40 Ibid., p. 667.  
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understanding of EU policy-making in various fields.41 Our analysis establishes a quantitative 
database to improve understanding of EU policy-making in ENP countries and Turkey. 
Seeing the EIB as a multiplier of EU actions, Ujvari focuses on the EIB’s contribution 
to the EU’s “external actions and objectives”.42 He concludes that the EIB can be a multiplier 
of EU external action, for instance as promoter of EU development policy standards vis-à-vis 
the increasing number of development finance donors.”43 The analysis accounts for challenges 
of co-financing and competition between MDBs. However, it assumes that MDBs’ activities 
are of such relevance for third countries that they follow the carrot-stick logic. Taking into 
account the experiences of the carrot-and-stick logic in the ENP countries, this assumption is 
up for debate. Complementary to this actor approach, we analyse how external events 
influence the EIB investments.   
Pinder points out the EIB’s ability to quickly adapt its operations in the aftermath of 
the recession caused by the oil crisis in 1979. 44 The EIB follows the European Commission 
when defining the geographic focus of its operations. The EIB’s impacts on employment 
creation and protection remained limited.45 While Pinder analyses the impacts of a major 
external event, the oil crisis, on EIB operations within the community, we are complementary 
by looking outside the community. Both approaches look for a political agenda within the 
demand-driven EIB. 
 
                                                 
41 Ibid., p. 669. 
42 This study was published after the submission. The following paragraph is edited later.  
Balazs Ujvari,’The European Investment Bank: An Overlooked (F)Actor in EU External Action?’, Egmont 
Paper, no. 94, 2017, p. 4. 
43 Ibid , pp. 5-6, 40-41.  
44 D. Pinder, ‘Small Firms, Regional Development and the European Investment Bank’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 1986, pp. 171, 185. 
45 Ibid. 
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3. EIB Signatures in ENP countries  
Our dependent variable is the EIB’s annual signatures as of 31 December of that year referred 
to hereafter as ‘signatures’. For instance, the EIB has signatures worth of EUR 77.5 billion 
between the 1 January and 31 December 2015, as can be seen in Graph 1.46 In order to 
accurately estimate the impacts of our three events, we analyse EIB signatures in the ENP 
countries on three different aggregation levels. We first analyse data on EIB signatures in ENP 
countries at the global level. Second, we discuss signatures in each of the two ENP dimensions. 
Third, we examine signatures at the country level. The EIB starts operating in 1994 in the 
Southern and in 2007 in the Eastern dimension.47 
Global level of EIB signatures 
The global volume of EIB signatures in ENP countries shows a slight upward trend. 
Annual EIB signatures in ENP countries have more than doubled in the observation period. 
The total volume of EIB signatures increases since 2001 despite a sharp decrease between 
2010 and 2012, which is caused by the Global Financial Crisis. This can be seen in in Graph 
1. In late 2008, the EIB and its shareholders “agree[d] on exceptional increase in lending until 
the end of 2010, in support of the EU economy.” 48 As part of the three-year Corporate 
Operational Plan 2012-2014, approved in December 2011 by the Board of Directors, the 
decline in signatures by EUR 8.7 billion in 2012 confirms the trajectory of reducing annual 
signatures to EUR 48.0 billion.49 However, one year later in December 2012 and contrary to 
“the deterioration of the economic environment”, the EIB’s shareholders unanimously 
approve a capital injection to improve the EIB’s “contribution to economic recovery in Europe 
without compromising its financial strength.”50 The shareholders decided on a EUR 10.0 
                                                 
46 Chapter 0 provides a definition of signature. 
47 EIB, 2017b, loc. cit.  
48 EIB, 2012a, op. cit., p.4. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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billion increase in paid-in capital that would enable the EIB “to provide up to EUR 60 billion 
for additional lending within the EU.”51 The rise of new signatures in 2013 is largely a result 
of this capital injection.52  
In line with shareholders’ emphasis to promote economic growth within the Union, 
signatures grew faster within the EU compared to outside the Union. The different slopes of 
the trend lines illustrate this. However, signatures outside the EU had lower volatility. These 
signatures fell in the years of the Global Financial Crisis and the Arab Spring, while they 
increased in the year of the conflict in Ukraine.53 
 
Graph 1: Global EIB signatures54 
Regional level of EIB signatures 
The volume of signatures in ENP countries grew at a slower pace than outside the EU, 
as presented in Graph 2. Signatures in the Southern dimension are above the ones of the 
Eastern dimension until 2012, before they plunged in 2013. In 2014, they recovered and 
exceeded again the ones in the Eastern dimension. On the other hand, the Eastern dimension 
                                                 
51 EIB, Financial Report 2012, Luxembourg, 2013b, p.4. 
52 EIB, Financial Report 2013, Luxembourg, 2014a, p.4. 
53 The entire data set is available upon request. 
54 Author, based on EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015, Luxembourg, 2002-2016. 
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experienced a continuous growth in signatures. This can also be seen in the higher slope of the 
latter’s trend line.  
In the year of the Global Financial Crisis, signatures in the Southern dimension 
decreased. Nevertheless, they reached their peak in 2010. As during the Global Financial 
Crisis, they plunged during the Arab Spring. However, they recover in 2012 before falling 
again in 2013. In contrast to the previous two events, signatures in the Southern dimension 
grow during the conflict in Ukraine. The regional data indicates a small decrease in signatures 
for 2015 because Morocco and Tunisia experience a decline. 
Signatures in the Eastern dimension constantly grew except in 2008, 2009 and 2013. 
Thus, they fell during the Global Financial Crisis, while increasing both during the Arab 
Spring and the conflict in Ukraine. 
 
Graph 2: EIB signatures in the ENP dimensions55 
In both dimensions, the EIB’s own resources dominated third party resources. In our 
observation period, between 96.4% and 100.0% of annual signatures in the Southern 
dimension were funded by EIB’s own resources, while funding came almost exclusively from 
EIB’s own resources in the Eastern dimension.  
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
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When looking at the absolute number of projects signed, there was an increase in 2007 
and a more pronounced one in 2012. One year later, it fell by more than half. They peaked 
again in 2014 before sharply falling in 2015. Graph 33 illustrates the absolute number of 
annual signatures in the two dimensions and combined for both dimensions. 
In both dimensions, the number of projects signed shows similarities in their behaviour 
patterns. These results indicate that there is an unknown underlying variable driving the 
number of signatures in the two dimensions. 
In the Southern dimension, the number of signatures increased during the Global 
Financial Crisis and decreased after the event until 2011. Similar to the Global Financial 
Crisis, they increased in the year of the conflict in Ukraine.  
In the Eastern dimension, the number of signatures increased in 2010, two years after 
the Global Financial Crisis. A similar development took places after the outbreak of the Arab 
Spring, when they rose in 2012. The current decline began in 2014, the year of the conflict in 
Ukraine. 
 
Graph 3: Number of signatures in the ENP dimensions56 
Similar to the number of signatures, average signatures size increased. It decreased in 
both dimensions during the Global Financial Crisis. While average signature size decreased in 
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
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the Southern dimension, it grew in the Eastern one during the Arab Spring. Since the Arab 
Spring, the two averages moved almost identically. They both rose during the conflict in 
Ukraine. Graph 4 shows the average signature size for each of the two dimensions. 
 
Graph 4: Average signature size57 
Country Level of EIB Signatures in the Southern dimension  
While our previous analysis at the global and regional level accounted for dynamics 
between the regions and between the countries, the following country-level analysis allows 
for the consideration of local developments. We begin our country-level analysis with the 
Southern dimension. 
Algeria 
In our observation period, the EIB undertook two signatures in Algeria, as can be seen 
in Graph 55. The minor one in 2003 supported a food processing company, while the major 
one in 2010 was for the construction and operation of a natural gas pipeline between Algeria 
and Spain.  
Both projects were signed before the Global Financial Crisis. Since the sample consists 
of two entries and is unequally distributed, we cannot say that the Global Financial Crisis 
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
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influenced EIB operations in Algeria. When taking into account the long-term trend, 
signatures decreased since 2004. Even after the peak in 2010, signatures fell back to zero 
afterwards. We therefore avoid interpreting the absence of signatures after the Arab Spring 
and the conflict in Ukraine.  
 
Graph 5: Signatures Algeria58 
Egypt 
In Egypt, signatures increased during the Global Financial Crisis and fell the following 
year, as shown in Graph 6. Like in Algeria, they reached a peak in 2010 before plunging the 
year after. In contrast to Algeria, signatures showed an upward trend since 2011. Thus, the 
Global Financial Crisis caused a decrease in signatures in the short-term before accelerating 
them in the medium-term. The medium-term growth was temporarily but significantly 
suppressed by the outbreak of the Arab Spring. Since the Arab Spring, signatures showed a 
strong upward trend. They significantly grew during the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 and the 
year after. 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
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Graph 6: Signatures Egypt59 
Israel 
Signatures in Israel reached a peak in 2006 and in 2011. These peaks were driven by 
signatures in the sanitation and water desalination field. The lower peak during the conflict in 
Ukraine was due to signatures for solar thermal electric plants. Graph 7illustrates the findings 
for Israel. 
Despite an increase after the Global Financial Crisis and the Arab Spring, the 
characteristics of these larger signatures in Water Management & Urban Development and 
Energy are unlikely to be driven by our three external events.  
 
Graph 7: Signatures Israel60 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
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Jordan 
In Jordan, signatures reached a peak in 2009. In contrast to Egypt but to similar to 
Israel, they fell during the Global Financial Crisis and increased the year after the Global 
Financial Crisis before plunging in the medium-term again. The rise in 2009 referred to a 
drinking water project, including a water extraction system and a 325km water pipeline. This 
single signature was worth EUR 165.8 million. 
Signatures rose again in Jordan during the Arab Spring and dropped during the conflict 
in Ukraine. The signatures in these two years concerned a fertilizer production site, local water 
management and a green energy corridor. Taking into account the large volatility in signatures, 
we cannot say that the significant increase in 2011 and decrease in 2014 are caused by the two 
latter events. Graph 8 shows the findings for Jordan.  
 
Graph 8: Signatures Jordan61 
Lebanon 
Signatures in Lebanon peaked the year before the Global Financial Crisis. In 2008, 
they fell. Since the signatures in Lebanon often concerned small- and medium-scale projects 
with financial intermediaries, global economic slowdown affected them. 62  Signatures 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 EIB, 2008, op. cit.,. p. 28.  
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recovered slightly the following year before falling again in 2010. Lebanon was one of the few 
countries where signatures increased in 2011. Despite its tight relations to Syria and 
Hezbollah’s entrance into the Syrian conflict in 2012, signatures considerably increased in 
2012 and in 2014.63 However, the signatures decreased to nearly zero in 2013 and to zero in 
2015. 
The signatures in 2012 and 2014 covered again small- and medium-size projects 
financed through private financial intermediaries, projects improving energy efficiency and 
the construction of a motorway. These signatures do no indicate any relation with the conflict 
in Ukraine. Graph 99 visualizes our analysis.  
 
Graph 9: Signatures Lebanon64 
Morocco 
Signatures in Morocco increased at beginning of the Global Financial Crisis before 
they sank in 2010 and 2011. While its signatures decreased during the Arab Spring, Morocco 
experienced the highest signatures in the entire Southern dimension, namely EUR 1’004.7 
million in 2012. The country also had the second highest number of projects in the dimension 
in the same year; the three largest signatures accounted for more than half of the entire 
                                                 
63 J. Rosenfeld, How the Syrian civil war has transformed Hezbollah, The Nation, 2017, retrieved 28 April 2017, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-the-syrian-civil-war-has-transformed-hezbollah/.  
64 Author, based on EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015. 
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signatures in that year, namely EUR 540.0 million. The largest and third largest projects 
concern road construction, while the second largest extends electricity transmission 
infrastructure. Graph 100 present the data for Morocco. 
Considering both the volume and the number of signatures, the Global Financial 
Crisis significantly decreased EIB operations in Morocco. This speaks for the integration of 
the Moroccan economy in the global economy. In contrast, the Arab Spring drove EIB 
operations in Morocco. This might be due to the popular support King Mohammed VI enjoys. 
Moreover, his majesty’s prudent reaction regarding the 20 February movement created less 
violent protests compared to other countries in the Southern dimension, thus maintaining the 
conditions under which investments could be carried out.65  
 
Graph 10: Signatures in Morocco66 
Gaza-West Bank 
EIB signed two projects in Gaza-West Bank during the observation period. In 2010, 
the EIB injected EUR 55.0 million in a private equity fund that invested in local SMEs. In 
                                                 
65 A. Lawrence, The mixed record of Morocco‘s February 20 protest movement, The Washington Post, 2016, 
retrieved 29 April 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/20/the-mixed-
record-of-moroccos-february-20-protest-movement/?utm_term=.a845e134b20c.  
66 Author, based on EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015. 
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2013, an electric cable manufacturer received EUR 5.0 million funding from the EIB. The 
sample size is therefore too small to draw any conclusion related to our three events. 
Syria 
Signatures in Syria increased until 2008 before they fell during the Global Financial 
Crisis. This fall indicates that the Syrian economy was integrated into the global economy. 
They increased again in 2010. They immediately fell to zero once the regime started to 
violently suppress protests in 2011.67 There were no new signatures since 2011. Graph 11 
present the data for Syria. The majority of signatures were with the Syrian government; 
signatures with private partners included solely international companies. 
Since 2004, signatures in Energy dominated. In 2010, the EIB provided funding worth 
EUR 130.0 for medical equipment for new hospitals, which caused a peak in Health & 
Education in that year. 
Syria is the only country in our sample where both the Global Financial Crisis and the 
Arab Spring significantly decreased signatures.  
 
Graph 11: Signatures Syria68 
                                                 
67 M. Slackman, Syrian troops open fire on protesters in several cities, The New York Times, 2011, retrieved 30 
April 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/world/middleeast/26syria.html. 
68 Author, based on EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015. 
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Tunisia 
Signatures in Tunisia increased at the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis, which 
is similar to Morocco. However, and in contrast to Morocco, Tunisia saw an increase in 
signatures until 2010. Road programmes and natural gas transmission projects drove 
signatures. The trigger country of the Arab Spring experienced a continuous fall in signatures 
between 2011 and 2013. Signatures significantly rose in 2014 before considerably falling 
again in 2015. A natural gas project of EUR 380.0 million drove the signatures in 2014. 
While the Global Financial Crisis had positive impacts on signatures and the Arab 
Spring has negative ones, our data cannot attribute the decline in 2015 to the conflict in 
Ukraine. We attribute the decline to “social tensions that mark the first half of 2015 [and to 
the] effects of three terrorist attacks”. 69  These developments raised uncertainty and the 
country’s risks. Accordingly, the cost of capital increased; fewer projects were economically 
viable. Graph 1212 illustrates our analysis. 
 
Graph 12: Signatures Tunisia70 
                                                 
69 The World Bank, Tunisia’s Economic Outlook – Spring 2016, Washington, The World Bank Group, 2016, 
p.1. 
70 Author, based on EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015. 
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Country Level of EIB Signatures in the Eastern dimension  
When analysing long term trends, note that the EIB did not have the mandate to operate 
in the Eastern dimension before 2006. First operations were carried out in 2007. 
Armenia 
EIB operations started in 2010 and continuously grew until 2014 before plunging in 
2015. This decline is most likely due to the economic slowdown caused by a slump in “global 
metal prices, falling remittances, and an unexpected cabinet reshuffle”, accompanied by a 
constitutional referendum.71 Thus, signatures rose both during the Arab Spring and the conflict 
in Ukraine. 
The highest volume in signatures took places in Communication, followed by Credit 
Lines. In 2013, signatures with the Armenian government for improving telecommunications 
infrastructure accounted for EUR 60.0 million. In 2014, a signature of over EUR 49.9 million 
with the Armenian Central Bank provided loans to SMEs. In order to strengthen the private 
sector, the EIB identified SMEs as a focus area. Graph 13 illustrates our results. 
 
Graph 13: Signatures Armenia72 
                                                 
71 The World Bank, Armenia: Economy, 2017a, retrieved 30 April 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ 
armenia/overview#3.  
72 Author, based on EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015. 
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Azerbaijan 
The EIB has signed three projects in Azerbaijan since 2013. Moreover, each project 
was larger than its predecessor. In 2013, the signature was with an investment vehicle that 
funded green energy projects. In both 2014 and 2015, Credit Lines were given to two banks 
providing SME loans. 
Like in the case of Armenia, it might be possible that the Global Financial Crisis or the 
Arab Spring postponed earlier planned signatures in Azerbaijan. However, our data is not deep 
enough and our sample not sufficiently large to test such a hypothesis. Despite the ongoing 
increase since the conflict in Ukraine, we cannot testify our hypothesis for Azerbaijan. 
 
Graph 14: Signatures Azerbaijan73 
Georgia 
Georgia experienced its first signatures in 2010. They fell the following year before 
reaching their highest value in 2012. The first peak in 2010 concerned the construction of a 
power transmission grid and the upgrade of water facilities. The second peak in 2012 was 
caused by to a highway construction and SME loan schemes for energy projects.74 Afterwards, 
signatures fell to zero until 2014. In 2015, they regained strength. Apart from the SME loans 
schemes, signatures in Georgia often aimed at improving Georgia’s connection with Turkey. 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
74 The EIB lists road construction in the Energy sector. 
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The absence of signatures in 2008 and 2009 might be due to the five-day war with 
Russia leading to the secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and less to the Global Financial 
Crisis. Our data indicates that EIB operations rose shortly after the Arab Spring before 
plunging afterwards. Graph 15 illustrates our data. 
Besides Moldova, Georgia is the only country in the Eastern dimension, where 
signatures fell during the conflict in Ukraine. However and similar Azerbaijan and Ukraine, 
signatures in Georgia grew significantly the year after. Similar to Armenia and Syria, the prime 
partner for signatures was the national government.  
 
Graph 15: Signatures Georgia75 
Moldova 
In 2007, the first EIB operations in the Eastern dimension simultaneously took place 
in Moldova and Ukraine. The first signature was with the Moldovan government and covered 
a road construction programme, as can be seen in Graph 16. 
Signatures reached a first peak in 2010 and a second larger one in 2013. Both were 
related to a larger signatures for road construction. Signatures in 2014 were driven by a credit 
line of EUR 120.0 million to the Moldovan government.  
                                                 
75 Author, based on EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015. 
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There were no signatures in 2015. This is most likely due to the banking crisis in 
Moldova. The Moldovan government bailed out three banks with an amount equivalent to an 
eighth of Moldova’s GDP.76 The crisis confirmed the opacity of the Moldovan economy and 
politics, potentially discouraging foreign investments which have to respect sound banking 
principles. 77  Since Moldova has a considerable Russian minority, especially in the self-
declared state Transnistria, concerns about similar undertakings as in Crimea rose in the 
aftermath of the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.78 Thus, the sharp decline in 2015 can be 
attributed to both the conflict in Ukraine and to this domestic development. Since 
Communication included road construction, it was the dominant sector in Moldova. Credit 
Lines followed. The vast majority of signatures included local or national authorities as 
partners. This feature was the most pronounced in Moldova.  
 
Graph 16: Signatures Moldova79 
Ukraine 
The first EIB operations in the Eastern dimension started in Moldova and Ukraine in 
2007. However, Ukraine was the only country in the Eastern dimension where the EIB had 
                                                 
76  T. Whewell, The great Moldovan bank robbery, BBC News, 2015, retrieved 30 April, 2017. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33166383.  
77 Ibid. 
78 I. Bond, ‘The EU, NATO, and Ukraine: prospects for future co-operation’, in: A. Pabriks & A. Kudors (eds.), 
The war in Ukraine: lessons for Europe, Riga, Centre for East European Policy Studies, p. 141. 
79 Author, based on EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015. 
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signatures in each year since the bank began operating there. It also saw the largest annual 
signature volume in the entire sample in 2015. After Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, Ukraine 
was fourth in total volume in signatures in the observation period. 
Signatures in Ukraine decreased after the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis and 
fell until 2010. Since 2010, they sharply grew until 2015, with an exception in 2013. Our data 
indicates that the outbreak of the Arab Spring reduced signatures that year. Thus, signatures 
in Ukraine reacted less negatively to the Arab Spring than to the Global Financial Crisis. We 
see an opposite relationship with the conflict in Ukraine, which significantly accelerated 
signatures. Graph 177 illustrates our results. 
 
Graph 17: Signatures Ukraine80 
4. EIB Signatures in Turkey: The Crossroad between the Southern and Eastern 
Dimension 
Turkey is the crossroad between the Southern and Eastern dimensions of the ENP. It is the 
only country neighbouring both dimensions. Its geographically strategic position combined 
with military and economic power – its armed forces are the second largest in NATO and its 
economy is the 18th largest in the world – make Turkey a crucial element when analysing EIB 
operations in ENP countries.81 To illustrate the scope of the EIB’s operations in Turkey, more 
                                                 
80 Ibid. 
81 The World Bank, 2017b, loc. cit. 
Taylor, loc. cit. 
0,
0
0,
0
0,
0
0,
0
0,
0
0,
0
20
0,
0
15
0,
0
10
0,
0
15
,5
62
5,
0
64
0,
0
41
8,
7
94
0,
0 1
.2
57
,7
0,0
300,0
600,0
900,0
1.200,0
EU
R 
m
ill
io
n
 27 
than EUR 25.8 billion signatures have been carried out there since 2001.82 Moreover, the EIB 
has had operations in Turkey since 1965.83  
The EIB’s annual signatures remain our dependent variable. In the observation period, 
signatures in Turkey exceeded the ones in both ENP dimensions in all years but in 2010, when 
signatures in the Southern dimension reached their peak. Despite a decline in 2013, signatures 
in Turkey followed an upward trend since 2010. So did signatures in the Eastern dimension. 
However, they followed a downward trend in the Southern dimension. Moreover, signatures 
in Turkey had a lower volatility compared to the two ENP dimensions since 2010. Graph 1818 
compares the signatures of Turkey with the two ENP dimensions. 
 
Graph 18: Signatures in the ENP dimensions and in Turkey84 
Signatures continuously rose before the Global Financial Crisis. They reached their 
peak in the year of the Global Financial Crisis. While signatures almost maintained their level 
the following year, they significantly fell in 2010. Despite the Arab Spring and the emerging 
civil war in Syria, they steadily grew until 2012 before falling to the pre-Arab Spring level in 
2013. The decline in 2013 might be due to the political turmoil sparked by violent crackdown 
                                                 
82 Author, based on EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015. 
83 EIB, 2017e, loc. cit. 
84 Author, based on EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015. 
0
1000
2000
3000
EU
R 
m
ill
io
n
Southern
dimension
Eastern
dimension
Turkey
 28 
of protests on the Taksim square.85 Signatures increased during the conflict in Ukraine as well 
as in the last year of the observation period. 
Thus, both the Global Financial Crisis decreased signatures with a one year lag, while 
the Arab Spring did so with a two year lag. There was no lag regarding the conflict in Ukraine.  
Although the ongoing domestic turmoil and the entrance into the conflict with Syria 
created uncertainty and worsened the environment for investments, EIB signatures maintained 
their level with minor deviations. Graph9 illustrates our analysis. 
 
Graph19: Signatures Turkey86 
Despite a decline during the Global Financial Crisis and the Arab Spring, the number 
of signatures followed an upward trend until 2013. In the year of the conflict in Ukraine, the 
number of signatures fell and stayed constant the following year. Graph 190 presents our 
results. 
                                                 
85 J. Reynolds, Turkish police tear gas protesters on Taksim anniversary, 2014, BBC News, retrieved 29 April 
2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27649472. 
86 Author, based on EIB, Statistical Reports 2001-2015. 
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Graph 190: Number of signatures in Turkey87 
The number of signatures followed closely the volume in signatures, as illustrated in 
Graph0. Nevertheless, the average signature size, which is the ratio between these two 
variables, fell after the Global Financial Crisis because the number of signatures increased but 
the volume in signatures decreased. Since both volume in signatures and number of signature 
showed a lower volatility during and after the Arab Spring, the average signature size also had 
a lower volatility. Graph 201 shows the average signature size. 
 
Graph 201: Average signature size88 
  
                                                 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
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5. Conclusion 
Our findings for EIB’s signatures in ENP countries and Turkey are diverse. The extent to 
which the Global Financial Crisis, the Arab Spring, and the conflict in Ukraine impacted EIB 
signatures in ENP countries varies significantly between the two dimensions as well as 
between the countries within the dimensions.89 Table 1summarizes our results.90 
 H1 H2 H3 
ENP Global    
    
ENP Dimension    
Southern     
Eastern     
    
ENP Country Level Southern Dimension 
Algeria n/a n/a n/a 
Egypt    
Gaza-West Bank n/a n/a n/a 
Israel    
Lebanon    
Morocco    
Syria   n/a 
Tunisia   n/a 
 
ENP Country Level Eastern Dimension 
Armenia n/a   
Azerbaijan n/a n/a n/a 
Georgia n/a   
Moldova    
Ukraine    
  
  
n/a  
Hypothesis accepted 
Hypothesis rejected 
Hypothesis cannot be tested 
Table 1: Hypothesis Summary. 
                                                 
89 See table 1. 
90 Our three hypotheses read as follows: 
H1: The Global Financial Crisis decreased EIB signatures in the sample countries. 
H2: The Arab Spring decreased EIB signatures in the sample countries. 
H3: The conflict in Ukraine decreased EIB signatures in the sample countries. 
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ENP Global 
At the global level, signatures showed an upward trend. They doubled in the 
observation period. Yet, they faced two declines. The Global Financial Crisis caused a minor 
decline in global ENP signatures of 11.8% in 2008, while overall EIB signatures increased by 
24.0%. The Arab Spring caused a major decrease in global ENP signatures of 44.8%, while 
overall EIB signatures dropped by 15.5% in 2011. Since the EIB predominately invests within 
the EU, the overall fall was due to the economic slowdown in EU. This corresponds to the 
EIB’s demand-driven approach. The conflict in Ukraine did not influence global ENP 
signatures. Accordingly, we accept H1, saying that the Global Financial Crisis decreases 
signatures in ENP countries at the global level. We also accept H2 saying that the Arab Spring 
decreased signatures in ENP countries at the global level. However, we reject H3 saying that 
the conflict in Ukraine reduces EIB signatures at the global level. 
ENP Regions 
We found mixed results for the two dimensions. Signatures in the Southern dimension 
reacted stronger to the three events than in the Eastern dimension. Thus, signatures in the 
Southern dimension had a higher volatility. Both dimensions showed an upward trend in their 
signatures. However, the one in the Eastern dimension is steeper. The Global Financial Crises 
reduced signatures in both dimensions. In the Southern dimension, signatures dropped by 
63.2% during the Arab Spring and increased by 198.6% during the conflict in Ukraine. In the 
Eastern dimension, signatures continued to grow both during the Arab Spring and the conflict 
in Ukraine by 143.3% and 115.4%, respectively. Signatures in the Eastern dimension 
continuously grew except in 2013. While starting at zero in 2006, they exceeded the other ones 
in 2015. This trend corresponded to the European Commission’s intention to raise the ceiling 
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and widen the scope of EIB’s funding for the Eastern dimension through the mid-term review 
of the EIB’s lending external mandate.91  
Consequently, we accept H1 in both dimensions. In the Southern dimension, we also 
accept H2 but we reject H3. In the Eastern dimension, we reject both H2 and H3. 
ENP Countries 
With the exception of Lebanon, economic growth slowed down in all the countries in 
the sample between 2011 and 2012. Accordingly, demand fell. However, signatures increased 
by 81.4% in the Southern dimension and by 38.1% in the Eastern dimension. The EIB changed 
its investment policy in terms of sectors. Signatures in Credit Lines and Energy significantly 
increased since the Arab Spring. They were the drivers of signatures’ growth that year. We 
attribute this increase to the ENP mid-term review of 2011, where the European Commission 
suggested an “(…) additional lending envelope of EUR 1.0 billion” to the EIB.92 The EIB 
could mobilize almost EUR 6.0 billion of additional capital over 2011-2013 with this 
envelope.93 Put differently, the Member States and the European Commission decided on the 
EIB’s operations in the statutory bodies at the end of day. In parallel, the European 
Commission “(…) supported the extension of the EBRD mandate to selected southern 
Mediterranean countries”.94 As our analysis shows, the signatures stayed below this target. 
Both the shareholders and the EIB must consider recipient countries’ capacity to absorb EIB 
investments.  
At the country level in the Southern dimension, Algeria experienced a single signature 
worth of EUR 500.0 million in 2010. We therefore cannot test our hypothesis. However, since 
                                                 
91 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council: Eastern Partnership, COM(2008) 823 final, Brussels, 3 December 2008, p. 15. 
92  European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels: a new response to a changing 
Neighbourhood, COM(2011) 303 final, 25 May 2011, p. 20.  
93 Ibid. 
94 European Commission, 2011, loc. cit. 
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“Algeria does not fully participate (…)” in the ENP, the EU cannot entirely use its 
“institutional and productive power”. 95 Thus, Member States and the European Commission 
might reject Algerian projects in the statutory bodies until Algeria finishes negotiating an ENP 
Action Plan. Moreover, the European Commission expresses its opinion on every project on 
which the Board of Directors decides. For instance, “where the Commission delivers an 
unfavourable opinion, the Board of Directors may not grant (…)” financing unless it decides 
at unanimity. 96  The same rule applies when the Management Committee delivers an 
unfavourable opinion. Gaza-West Bank and Azerbaijan experienced three signatures during 
the entire observation period. Similar to Algeria, their limited sample size impedes an unbiased 
analysis to test our hypothesis. 
Signatures in Egypt rose in the year of the Global Financial Crisis. However, they 
sharply fell during the Arab Spring. Since the Arab Spring, signatures showed a strong upward 
trend. Thus, they also increased during the conflict in Ukraine. Consequently, we reject H1 
and H3, while accepting H2. 
Signatures in Israel fell in the year of the Global Financial Crisis, which is in line with 
its economic development and integration into the world economy. So, we accept H1 for Israel. 
During the Arab Spring, they significantly rose due to signatures in the sanitation and water 
desalination sector. Due to signatures for solar thermal plant, they also rose during the conflict 
in Ukraine. These signatures are unlikely to be driven by second and third events. Thus, we 
reject H2 and reject H3. 
Signatures in Lebanon peaked the year before the Global Financial Crisis. In 2008, 
they fell. Since the signatures often finance small- and medium scale projects through financial 
intermediaries, global economic slowdown affected them.97 Signatures recovered slightly the 
                                                 
95 R. Bengtsson, The EU and the European security order: interfacing security actors, Routledge, London, 
2009, p. 83. 
96 Article 19(6) EIB Statute. 
97 EIB, Statistical Reports 2007, Luxembourg, 2008, p. 28.  
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year after before falling again in 2010. Lebanon is one of the few countries where signatures 
increased in 2011. Despite its tight relations to Syria and Hezbollah’s entrance into the Syrian 
conflict in 2012, signatures considerably increased in 2012 and again in 2014.98 However, 
signatures fell to zero the following year. Accordingly, we accept H1, while rejecting H2 and 
reject H3. 
Considering both the volume and the number of signatures, the Global Financial 
Crisis significantly decreased EIB operations in Morocco. This speaks for the integration of 
the Moroccan economy in the global economy. In contrast, the Arab Spring increased the 
EIB’s operations in Morocco. This might be due to King Mohammed VI’s wise reaction 
regarding the 20 February movement that created less violent protests compared to other 
countries during the Arab Spring; and thus maintained conditions under which investments 
could be carried out. 99 One year after the Arab Spring breaks out, Morocco experienced the 
highest signatures in the entire Southern dimension. Signatures significantly rose during the 
conflict in Ukraine. Consequently, we accept H1 for Morocco. We reject both H2 and H3. 
Syria is the only country in our sample where signatures decreased after both the 
Global Financial Crisis and the Arab Spring. The majority of signatures were with the Syrian 
government; signatures with private partners included only international companies. 
Considering that signatures in other ENP countries and Turkey continued despite ongoing 
turmoil and an open conflict, e.g. in Ukraine, and that the Syrian government was the principal 
partner of the EIB, the decrease in signatures in Syria since the outbreak of the Arab Spring 
puts forward that the EIB pursued a political agenda going beyond purely economic demand-
driven operations. Interviewees confirmed this statement, however not for Syria, but for 
Ukraine. Thus, we accept H1 and H2. However, we cannot test H3. 
                                                 
98 Rosenfeld, loc. cit.  
99 Lawrence, loc. cit. 
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Signatures in Tunisia increased at the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis, which 
is similar to Morocco. Road programmes and natural gas transmission projects drive 
signatures. The trigger country of the Arab Spring experienced a continuous fall of signatures 
during the Arab Spring. Signatures significantly rose in 2014. A natural gas project of EUR 
380.0 million drove the signatures in 2014. Signatures fell again in 2015. We attribute the 
decline to “social tensions that mark the first half of 2015 […and to the] effects of three 
terrorist attacks”. 100  These developments raised uncertainty and the country’s risks. 
Accordingly, the cost of capital increased; fewer projects were economically viable. Thus, we 
accept H1 and H2. However, we cannot test H3. 
At the country level in the Eastern dimension, our data suggests that neither the Global 
Financial Crisis, the Arab Spring nor the conflict in Ukraine influenced signatures in Armenia. 
The EIB’s operations started in 2010. Thus, it might be possible that the Global Financial 
Crisis postponed signatures planned for 2008 to 2009. Our data is not deep enough to verify 
such an explanation. We therefore cannot test H1, while we reject H2 and H3. 
EIB’s operations in Georgia started in 2010. The absence of signatures in Georgia in 
2008 might be due to the five-day war with Russia leading to the secession of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, and less to the Global Financial Crisis. Like in the case of Armenia, our data is 
not deep enough to verify such explanation. Consequently, we cannot test H1 for Georgia. 
Signatures significantly fall in the year of both the Arab Spring and the conflict in Ukraine. 
Hence, we accept H2 and H3. Similar to Armenia and Syria, the prime partner for signatures is 
the national government. Moreover and apart from the SME loans schemes, signatures in 
Georgia often aim at improving Georgia’s connection with Turkey. 
Moldova experienced falling signatures in all the years of the three events. Moreover, 
it experienced no signatures in 2015. This is most likely due to the banking crisis in which the 
                                                 
100 The World Bank, 2016, loc. cit. 
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Moldovan government bailed out three banks with an amount equivalent to an eighth of 
Moldova’s GDP.101 Moldova is the only country for which we accept all three hypotheses. 
Signatures in Ukraine negatively reacted to the Global Financial Crisis, while they 
positively do to the Arab Spring and the conflict in Ukraine. Signatures in Ukraine decreased 
in the year of the Global Financial Crisis and continued to fall until 2010. They significantly 
increased in the year of the Arab Spring. In the year of its conflict, signatures increased by 
124.8%. In 2015, they grew by 33.7%. Ukraine’s increased country risk caused by its conflict 
in the Eastern of the country increased the costs of capital, and thus fewer projects were 
economically viable. Therefore, we attribute the ongoing raise in EIB signatures to the 
shareholders intention to boost support for Ukraine. Thus, we accept H1 for Ukraine. However, 
we reject H2 and H3. 
Turkey: The Crossroad between the Southern and Eastern Dimension 
Turkey saw rising signatures in the year of the Global Financial Crisis and Arab Spring. 
Signatures fell during the conflict in Ukraine. They continuously grew before the Global 
Financial Crisis. They reached their peak during the Crisis and can almost maintain their level 
the following year. Despite the Arab Spring and the emerging civil war in Syria, they steadily 
grew between 2011 and 2013. Signatures rose in the year of the conflict in Ukraine. However, 
this decline is more likely to be due to the turmoil sparked by the violent crackdown of protests 
on Taksim square and the contagion of the conflict in Syria. 102 Both developments increased 
the risk; fewer projects were economically viable. Although the ongoing domestic turmoil and 
the entrance into the conflict with Syria created uncertainty and worsened the environment for 
investments, EIB signatures maintained their level with minor deviations. Resources for 
signatures in Turkey virtually exclusively came from the EIB itself. Third party resources were 
                                                 
101 Whewell, loc. cit. 
102 Reynolds, loc. cit. 
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used only once and account for EUR 30.0 million. We find similar results in the ENP 
dimensions. Accordingly, we accept H2, while we reject H1 and H3 for Turkey. 
 H1 H2 H3 
Turkey    
  
  
n/a  
Hypothesis accepted 
Hypothesis rejected 
Hypothesis cannot be tested 
Table 2: Summary Turkey 
Laying a Cornerstone for EIB research 
Based on our database, further research might address the correlation of EIB’s 
operations with economic and political variables such as GDP growth, government changes 
or with the ENP Progress Reports. This might offer new insights whether the EIB’s 
stakeholders try to establish a certain balance between the two dimensions and ENP countries 
according to variables, such as population size, that determine financing from other EU 
sources, like structural funds, despite the three events.  
In a comparative approach, research on other MDBs with operations in ENP countries 
could draw more general conclusions on how the three events influence their operations. 
Results based on several units of analysis would also address the issue of causality. Moreover, 
comparing the targets of different MDBs with their actual achieved results helps estimating 
the absorption capacity of recipient countries, which is often neglected when drafting policies 
and mandates for MDBs. Such research might also examine whether there is a mismatch 
between offered financing and the absorption capacity. 
What’s next for the EIB? 
Both the EIB and its shareholders, especially the European Commission, must consider 
recipient countries’ capacity to absorb EIB’s investments. The EIB might also increase 
coordination with other MDBs that are active in our sample countries. Besides avoiding 
competition between the different MDBs, such coordination allows sharing best-practices and 
 38 
information as well as expanding co-financing. It also takes better into account financing 
issues of cross-border projects. 
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